Root cause
Resource abuse & availability introduced
A Claude-assisted change adds TOTP and backup-code checks for destructive routes with no limit on failed attempts.
AI-assisted change: Claude
A Claude-assisted change added TOTP and backup-code checks with no attempt limit, and the limiter added later counts attempts only in each process's memory, so a client with a valid certificate can keep guessing codes.
How AI contributed: Direct introductionPublished Mar 31, 2026 in 
jahlives/openssl_encryptAll 20 findings in this repository
Show full advisory descriptionHide advisory description
openssl_encrypt's TOTP verification gained rate limiting through an in-memory defaultdict(list) held as a class variable in openssl_encrypt_server/modules/pepper/totp.py. Attempt timestamps and lockout deadlines lived inside a single process, so each extra worker and every restart started with an empty history. An attacker could spread guesses across workers or wait for a restart to keep submitting codes past the intended limit. The fix moves limiter storage behind a backend interface and adds a database implementation with its own table and expired-entry cleanup.
What actually happenedHide details
The Pepper module's TOTP and backup-code checks in the openssl_encrypt server had no attempt limit when a Claude-assisted change first added them, so a client holding a valid certificate could keep guessing codes on routes such as account deletion, the panic routes, TOTP disable and backup-code regeneration. Later hardening added a five-attempt limit, but it counts attempts in each process's memory, so the count resets on restart and is not shared between workers. A shared database backend exists but is not the default, and the extracted server project still ships the in-memory default, so the flaw remains unpatched. Published releases 1.4.0b3 through 1.4.1 carry it.
Fix status
No public fix identified
No minimum fix commit has been established for this finding.
Fix status unresolved
Case facts
- CVE ID
- CVE-2026-74878
- GHSA ID
- GHSA-H45M-MGCP-Q388
- Published
- Mar 31, 2026
- Severity
- Not scored
- Language
- Python
- AI tool
Claude- AI role
- Direct introduction
- Vulnerable release
- < 1.4.0
AI-assisted change
AI-assisted changeopenssl_encrypt_server/modules/pepper/totp.pysource jahlives/openssl_encrypt@9872c84399+29−0
@@ -0,0 +194,29 @@+ async def verify_code(self, client: PPClient, code: str) -> bool:+ """+ Verify TOTP code or backup code.+Show 25 hidden lines
+ Args:+ client: PPClient instance+ code: TOTP code (6 digits) or backup code (longer)++ Returns:+ True if code valid, False otherwise+ """+ if not client.totp_secret_encrypted or not client.totp_verified:+ return False++ # Try TOTP code first (6 digits)+ if len(code) == 6 and code.isdigit():+ secret = self._decrypt_secret(client.totp_secret_encrypted)+ totp = pyotp.TOTP(secret)+ if totp.verify(code, valid_window=1):+ logger.debug(f"TOTP code verified for {client.cert_fingerprint[:16]}")+ return True++ # Try backup code+ if await self._verify_backup_code(client.id, code):+ logger.info(f"Backup code used for {client.cert_fingerprint[:16]}")+ return True++ return False+Adds the TOTP and backup-code check with no count of failed attempts and no lockout, so a wrong guess costs the caller nothing.
AI-assisted changeopenssl_encrypt_server/modules/pepper/routes.pysource jahlives/openssl_encrypt@9872c84399+38−0
@@ -0,0 +60,38 @@+async def verify_totp_if_enabled(+ cert_fingerprint: str,+ totp_code: Optional[str],Show 27 hidden lines
+ db: AsyncSession+):+ """+ Verify TOTP code if 2FA enabled for client.++ Args:+ cert_fingerprint: Client certificate fingerprint+ totp_code: TOTP code from X-TOTP-Code header+ db: Database session++ Raises:+ HTTPException: If TOTP enabled but code invalid/missing+ """+ service = PepperService(db, settings.get_pepper_config())+ client = await service.get_client(cert_fingerprint)++ if client and client.totp_verified:+ # TOTP is enabled - require code+ if not totp_code:+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,+ detail="TOTP code required. Provide X-TOTP-Code header."+ )++ # Verify code+ totp_service = TOTPService(+ db,+ issuer="openssl_encrypt",+ fernet_key=settings.pepper_totp_secret_key+ )+ if not await totp_service.verify_code(client, totp_code):+ raise HTTPException(+ status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,+ detail="Invalid TOTP code"Show 1 hidden lines
+ )Destructive routes run this check on the code sent in the X-TOTP-Code header; a wrong code only returns 403, so a client with a valid certificate can keep retrying.