Root cause
Validation & fail-open logic introduced
The Claude-generated module decoded a key bundle and exposed to_identity() while leaving signature verification as an optional caller responsibility.
AI-generated deserialization code accepts unverified key-bundle data and converts it to an Identity, enabling encryption to an attacker-supplied public key.
How AI contributed: Direct introductionPublished Apr 1, 2026 in 
jahlives/openssl_encryptAll 20 findings in this repository
What actually happenedHide details
PublicKeyBundle.from_dict() decoded caller-controlled keys and a self-signature but returned the bundle without checking that signature. to_identity() then turned the unverified keys into a usable recipient identity. Version 1.4.0 verifies the signature before deserialization returns.
Fix
Security fix
Version 1.4.0 verifies the self-signature inside from_dict() by default and rejects invalid bundles before they can become recipient identities.
Case facts
- CVE ID
- CVE-2026-74876
- GHSA ID
- GHSA-8H88-GXP3-J7PG
- Published
- Apr 1, 2026
- Severity
- Not scored
- Language
- Python
- AI tool
Claude- AI role
- Direct introduction
- Vulnerable release
- 1.4.0b3
- Fixed release
- 1.4.0
AI-assisted change
AI-assisted changeopenssl_encrypt/modules/key_bundle.pysource jahlives/openssl_encrypt@fafdfeed1b+34−0
@@ -0,0 +328,34 @@ selected from new openssl_encrypt/modules/key_bundle.py+ @classmethod+ def from_dict(cls, data: Dict) -> "PublicKeyBundle":+ """+ Create bundle from dictionary.++ SECURITY: Does NOT verify signature. Call verify_signature() after creation.++ Args:+ data: Dictionary from to_dict()Show 17 hidden lines
++ Returns:+ PublicKeyBundle (unverified)++ Raises:+ KeyError: If required fields missing+ ValueError: If data format invalid+ """+ try:+ bundle = cls(+ name=data["name"],+ email=data.get("email"),+ fingerprint=data["fingerprint"],+ created_at=data["created_at"],+ encryption_public_key=base64.b64decode(data["encryption_public_key"]),+ signing_public_key=base64.b64decode(data["signing_public_key"]),+ encryption_algorithm=data["encryption_algorithm"],+ signing_algorithm=data["signing_algorithm"],+ self_signature=base64.b64decode(data["self_signature"]),+ )+ return bundle+ except KeyError as e:+ raise ValueError(f"Missing required field in bundle data: {e}")+ except Exception as e:Show 1 hidden lines
+ raise ValueError(f"Invalid bundle data format: {e}")The constructor decodes attacker-supplied public keys and the self-signature, then returns the bundle without checking that signature. A comment leaves verification to every caller, so the trust boundary fails open.
AI-assisted changeopenssl_encrypt/modules/key_bundle.pysource jahlives/openssl_encrypt@fafdfeed1b+29−0
@@ -0,0 +363,29 @@ selected from new openssl_encrypt/modules/key_bundle.py+ def to_identity(self) -> "Identity":+ """+ Convert bundle to Identity (public keys only).++ SECURITY: Creates Identity WITHOUT private keys (is_own_identity=False).+ This is safe for identities received from keyserver.++ Returns:Show 13 hidden lines
+ Identity instance (public keys only)+ """+ # Import Identity here to avoid circular import+ from .identity import Identity++ identity = Identity(+ name=self.name,+ email=self.email,+ fingerprint=self.fingerprint,+ created_at=self.created_at,+ encryption_algorithm=self.encryption_algorithm,+ signing_algorithm=self.signing_algorithm,+ encryption_public_key=self.encryption_public_key,+ encryption_private_key=None,+ signing_public_key=self.signing_public_key,+ signing_private_key=None,+ is_own_identity=False,+ )++ logger.debug(f"Converted bundle to Identity for '{self.name}'")Show 1 hidden lines
+ return identityto_identity() accepts that unverified bundle and copies its public keys into a usable recipient Identity. Encryption can therefore target a key chosen by the attacker before authenticity is established.
Security fix
Fixopenssl_encrypt/modules/key_bundle.pysource jahlives/openssl_encrypt@f4a1ba6600+12−5
@@ -326,21 +326,21 @@ class PublicKeyBundle: } @classmethod- def from_dict(cls, data: Dict) -> "PublicKeyBundle":+ def from_dict(cls, data: Dict, verify: bool = True) -> "PublicKeyBundle": """ Create bundle from dictionary. Show 21 hidden lines
- SECURITY: Does NOT verify signature. Call verify_signature() after creation.- Args: data: Dictionary from to_dict()+ verify: If True (default), verify self_signature before returning.+ Set to False only if verification happens separately. Returns:- PublicKeyBundle (unverified)+ PublicKeyBundle (verified if verify=True) Raises: KeyError: If required fields missing- ValueError: If data format invalid+ ValueError: If data format invalid or signature verification fails """ try: bundle = cls(@@ -354,9 +354,16 @@ class PublicKeyBundle: signing_algorithm=data["signing_algorithm"], self_signature=base64.b64decode(data["self_signature"]), )+ if verify:+ try:+ bundle.verify_signature()+ except Exception as e:+ raise ValueError(f"Bundle signature verification failed: {e}") return bundle except KeyError as e: raise ValueError(f"Missing required field in bundle data: {e}")Show 5 hidden lines
+ except ValueError:+ raise except Exception as e: raise ValueError(f"Invalid bundle data format: {e}") Version 1.4.0 makes verification the default, calls verify_signature() before returning the decoded bundle, and converts any failed check into an error. Callers can no longer forget the authenticity check.
Patch fingerprints
AI-assisted change 301c66ad900d9b5a2591f71192abc97b788e7cfee070386582d2f3361dcc34d3 · Fix ec479da1229a4e27b1f1667c9c07eef0b775aa36fdcb571d01d9decdc34fa15c