AI-written code allowed insecure Control UI auth over plaintext HTTP to grant privileged access when enabled.

How AI contributed: New attack surfacePublished Mar 3, 2026 in openclaw/openclawAll 35 findings in this repository

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Description In affected releases, when an operator explicitly enabled gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth: true and exposed the gateway over plaintext HTTP, Control UI authentication could permit privileged operator access without the intended device identity + pairing guarantees. This required an insecure deployment choice and credential exposure risk (for example, plaintext transit or prior token leak). It was fixed on main in commit 40a292619e1f2be3a3b1db663d7494c9c2dc0abf (PR #20684). Affected Packages / Versions · Package: openclaw (npm) · Affected published versions: <= 2026.2.19-2 · Planned patched version: 2026.2.21 Impact In these explicitly insecure deployments, an attacker with leaked/intercepted credentials could obtain high-privilege Control UI access. Fix Commit(s) · 40a292619e1f2be3a3b1db663d7494c9c2dc0abf (merged 2026-02-20) OpenClaw thanks @Vasco0x4 for reporting.

What actually happened

message-handler.ts skipped the required device identity check whenever the handshake carried an auth token, so a token-only Control UI connection could be accepted even when the gateway was served over plaintext HTTP with gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth enabled. The fix ties the control-ui exemption to the explicit device-auth disable flag, so allowInsecureAuth alone can no longer satisfy the handshake without a paired device.

Root cause

Authentication & access control

fix: allow token auth to bypass device identity requirement

AI-assisted change: Claude

079af0d0b0

src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts

Fix

Security fix

fix: Control UI Insecure Auth Bypass Allows Token-Only Auth Over HTTP (#20684)

Fix by Coy Geek · no AI marker found

40a292619e

src/security/audit.ts src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts src/gateway/server.auth.e2e.test.ts

Case facts

CVE ID: CVE-2026-32034
GHSA ID: GHSA-3CVX-236H-M9FJ
Published: Mar 3, 2026
Severity: MEDIUM
Language: JavaScript
AI tool: Claude
AI role: New attack surface
Vulnerable release: <= 2026.2.19-2
Fixed release: 2026.2.21

CWE-285 CWE-319 CWE-78

Advisory source

AI-assisted change

AI-assisted changesrc/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts source openclaw/openclaw@079af0d0b0+4−2

@@ -254,7 +254,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {          const device = connectParams.device;         let devicePublicKey: string | null = null;-        if (!device) {+        // Allow token-authenticated connections (e.g., control-ui) to skip device identity+        const hasTokenAuth = !!connectParams.auth?.token;+        if (!device && !hasTokenAuth) {

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           setHandshakeState("failed");           setCloseCause("device-required", {             client: connectParams.client.id,@@ -427,7 +429,7 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {         });         let authOk = authResult.ok;         let authMethod = authResult.method ?? "none";-        if (!authOk && connectParams.auth?.token) {+        if (!authOk && connectParams.auth?.token && device) {           const tokenCheck = await verifyDeviceToken({             deviceId: device.id,             token: connectParams.auth.token,

Lets gateway connections carrying an auth token skip the required device identity check, carving out the token-only path that insecure control-ui authentication relied on.

Security fix

Fixsrc/security/audit.ts source openclaw/openclaw@40a292619e+1−1

@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(       severity: "critical",       title: "Control UI allows insecure HTTP auth",       detail:-        "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true allows token-only auth over HTTP and skips device identity.",+        "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true is a legacy insecure-auth toggle; Control UI still enforces secure context and device identity unless dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth is enabled.",       remediation: "Disable it or switch to HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or localhost.",     });

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Rewrites the audit finding to describe allowInsecureAuth as a legacy toggle that still enforces secure context and device identity, instead of claiming it allows token-only authentication over HTTP.

Fixsrc/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts source openclaw/openclaw@40a292619e+6−2

@@ -341,7 +341,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {           isControlUi && configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true;         const disableControlUiDeviceAuth =           isControlUi && configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true;-        const allowControlUiBypass = allowInsecureControlUi || disableControlUiDeviceAuth;+        // `allowInsecureAuth` is retained for compatibility, but must not bypass+        // secure-context/device-auth requirements.+        const allowControlUiBypass = disableControlUiDeviceAuth;

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         const device = disableControlUiDeviceAuth ? null : deviceRaw;          const hasDeviceTokenCandidate = Boolean(connectParams.auth?.token && device);@@ -428,7 +430,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {            if (isControlUi && !allowControlUiBypass) {             const errorMessage = "control ui requires HTTPS or localhost (secure context)";-            markHandshakeFailure("control-ui-insecure-auth");+            markHandshakeFailure("control-ui-insecure-auth", {+              insecureAuthConfigured: allowInsecureControlUi,+            });             sendHandshakeErrorResponse(ErrorCodes.INVALID_REQUEST, errorMessage);             close(1008, errorMessage);             return;

Restricts the control-ui bypass to the explicit device-auth disable flag and tags handshake failures with the insecure-auth configuration, so allowInsecureAuth alone cannot skip device identity.

Fixsrc/gateway/server.auth.e2e.test.ts source openclaw/openclaw@40a292619e+24−4

@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ describe("gateway server auth/connect", () => {     });   }); -  test("allows control ui without device identity when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {+  test("rejects control ui without device identity even when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {     testState.gatewayControlUi = { allowInsecureAuth: true };     const { server, ws, prevToken } = await startServerWithClient("secret", {

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       wsHeaders: { origin: "http://127.0.0.1" },@@ -702,13 +702,32 @@ describe("gateway server auth/connect", () => {         mode: GATEWAY_CLIENT_MODES.WEBCHAT,       },     });-    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);+    expect(res.error?.message ?? "").toContain("secure context");     ws.close();     await server.close();     restoreGatewayToken(prevToken);   }); -  test("allows control ui with device identity when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {+  test("rejects control ui password-only auth when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {+    testState.gatewayControlUi = { allowInsecureAuth: true };+    testState.gatewayAuth = { mode: "password", password: "secret" };+    await withGatewayServer(async ({ port }) => {+      const ws = await openWs(port, { origin: originForPort(port) });+      const res = await connectReq(ws, {+        password: "secret",+        device: null,+        client: {+          ...CONTROL_UI_CLIENT,+        },+      });+      expect(res.ok).toBe(false);+      expect(res.error?.message ?? "").toContain("secure context");+      ws.close();+    });+  });++  test("does not bypass pairing for control ui device identity when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {     testState.gatewayControlUi = { allowInsecureAuth: true };     testState.gatewayAuth = { mode: "token", token: "secret" };     const { writeConfigFile } = await import("../config/config.js");@@ -753,7 +772,8 @@ describe("gateway server auth/connect", () => {             ...CONTROL_UI_CLIENT,           },         });-        expect(res.ok).toBe(true);+        expect(res.ok).toBe(false);+        expect(res.error?.message ?? "").toContain("pairing required");         ws.close();       });     } finally {

Replaces permissive expectations with rejection tests for device-less and password-only control-ui sessions and adds coverage that pairing is still required when insecure auth is enabled.

Patch fingerprints

AI-assisted change b94c5c5ced25b9bce426afccf67da47d98569efd9eb060e7500c7277aaa1278b · Fix a55cf7f65c9ee927890cf7a9a50519f225e903746f277a82a853816ad7c9fddc

Advisory references

AI-written code allowed insecure Control UI auth over plaintext HTTP to grant privileged access when enabled.

Show full advisory description

What actually happened

AI-assisted change

AI-assisted changesrc/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts source openclaw/openclaw@079af0d0b0+4−2

@@ -254,7 +254,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {          const device = connectParams.device;         let devicePublicKey: string | null = null;-        if (!device) {+        // Allow token-authenticated connections (e.g., control-ui) to skip device identity+        const hasTokenAuth = !!connectParams.auth?.token;+        if (!device && !hasTokenAuth) {

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           setHandshakeState("failed");           setCloseCause("device-required", {             client: connectParams.client.id,@@ -427,7 +429,7 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {         });         let authOk = authResult.ok;         let authMethod = authResult.method ?? "none";-        if (!authOk && connectParams.auth?.token) {+        if (!authOk && connectParams.auth?.token && device) {           const tokenCheck = await verifyDeviceToken({             deviceId: device.id,             token: connectParams.auth.token,

Lets gateway connections carrying an auth token skip the required device identity check, carving out the token-only path that insecure control-ui authentication relied on.

Security fix

Fixsrc/security/audit.ts source openclaw/openclaw@40a292619e+1−1

@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(       severity: "critical",       title: "Control UI allows insecure HTTP auth",       detail:-        "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true allows token-only auth over HTTP and skips device identity.",+        "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true is a legacy insecure-auth toggle; Control UI still enforces secure context and device identity unless dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth is enabled.",       remediation: "Disable it or switch to HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or localhost.",     });

Show 1 hidden lines

Rewrites the audit finding to describe allowInsecureAuth as a legacy toggle that still enforces secure context and device identity, instead of claiming it allows token-only authentication over HTTP.

Fixsrc/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts source openclaw/openclaw@40a292619e+6−2

@@ -341,7 +341,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {           isControlUi && configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true;         const disableControlUiDeviceAuth =           isControlUi && configSnapshot.gateway?.controlUi?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true;-        const allowControlUiBypass = allowInsecureControlUi || disableControlUiDeviceAuth;+        // `allowInsecureAuth` is retained for compatibility, but must not bypass+        // secure-context/device-auth requirements.+        const allowControlUiBypass = disableControlUiDeviceAuth;

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         const device = disableControlUiDeviceAuth ? null : deviceRaw;          const hasDeviceTokenCandidate = Boolean(connectParams.auth?.token && device);@@ -428,7 +430,9 @@ export function attachGatewayWsMessageHandler(params: {            if (isControlUi && !allowControlUiBypass) {             const errorMessage = "control ui requires HTTPS or localhost (secure context)";-            markHandshakeFailure("control-ui-insecure-auth");+            markHandshakeFailure("control-ui-insecure-auth", {+              insecureAuthConfigured: allowInsecureControlUi,+            });             sendHandshakeErrorResponse(ErrorCodes.INVALID_REQUEST, errorMessage);             close(1008, errorMessage);             return;

Restricts the control-ui bypass to the explicit device-auth disable flag and tags handshake failures with the insecure-auth configuration, so allowInsecureAuth alone cannot skip device identity.

Fixsrc/gateway/server.auth.e2e.test.ts source openclaw/openclaw@40a292619e+24−4

@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ describe("gateway server auth/connect", () => {     });   }); -  test("allows control ui without device identity when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {+  test("rejects control ui without device identity even when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {     testState.gatewayControlUi = { allowInsecureAuth: true };     const { server, ws, prevToken } = await startServerWithClient("secret", {

Show 46 hidden lines

       wsHeaders: { origin: "http://127.0.0.1" },@@ -702,13 +702,32 @@ describe("gateway server auth/connect", () => {         mode: GATEWAY_CLIENT_MODES.WEBCHAT,       },     });-    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);+    expect(res.ok).toBe(false);+    expect(res.error?.message ?? "").toContain("secure context");     ws.close();     await server.close();     restoreGatewayToken(prevToken);   }); -  test("allows control ui with device identity when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {+  test("rejects control ui password-only auth when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {+    testState.gatewayControlUi = { allowInsecureAuth: true };+    testState.gatewayAuth = { mode: "password", password: "secret" };+    await withGatewayServer(async ({ port }) => {+      const ws = await openWs(port, { origin: originForPort(port) });+      const res = await connectReq(ws, {+        password: "secret",+        device: null,+        client: {+          ...CONTROL_UI_CLIENT,+        },+      });+      expect(res.ok).toBe(false);+      expect(res.error?.message ?? "").toContain("secure context");+      ws.close();+    });+  });++  test("does not bypass pairing for control ui device identity when insecure auth is enabled", async () => {     testState.gatewayControlUi = { allowInsecureAuth: true };     testState.gatewayAuth = { mode: "token", token: "secret" };     const { writeConfigFile } = await import("../config/config.js");@@ -753,7 +772,8 @@ describe("gateway server auth/connect", () => {             ...CONTROL_UI_CLIENT,           },         });-        expect(res.ok).toBe(true);+        expect(res.ok).toBe(false);+        expect(res.error?.message ?? "").toContain("pairing required");         ws.close();       });     } finally {

Replaces permissive expectations with rejection tests for device-less and password-only control-ui sessions and adds coverage that pairing is still required when insecure auth is enabled.